Appendix A

The Holiness Spectrum and Its Flaws

Most interpreters of the Hebrew Bible assume that “holy” (qdš) refers fundamentally to a superlative state of clean (tähôr) and indeed that both fall along a gradated spectrum ranging from “abomination” at one end to “most holy” at the other. This gradation (often summarized by the phrase “holiness spectrum”) is usually represented by physical correspondence to various zones within the Israelite camp, with the holy of holies being the cleanest, and the area outside the camp being the most unclean. Individuals and objects are thought to progress inward (or outward) based on their particular levels of purity.

There are many different ideas about how exactly to nuance the particulars of the details of the holiness spectrum, but two basic templates for formulating it are notable. The first is a one-dimensional gradation from the extremes of “abomination” to “most holy.” Each of these is thought to refer to a status that is produced by performing a certain action in the previous state. According to this way of thinking, abomination (šqṣ) is totally destroyed (ḥrm) to become simply unclean (ṭāmēʾ), which is then cleansed (ṭhr) to become clean (tähôr), which is then consecrated (qdš) to become holy (qōdeš), which then can somehow become most holy (qōdeš haqqādāšîm). The process is thought to work in the other direction as well: something holy becomes profaned (ḥll), which then becomes defiled (ṭmʾ), which then does something detestable (tôʿēbâ) to become an abomination. These statuses are each given both a cultic and a moral component, which together are employed to search for keywords and place the various characters of the biblical text—especially the Canaanites—along the spectrum, with the idea that their location will explain (or dictate) the appropriate treatment of them.

The second model is based on the paired dichotomies of clean/unclean and holy/common in Leviticus 10:10. This model conceives of two parallel spectrums, one corresponding to the physical/cultic world (clean versus unclean) and the other corresponding to the moral/spiritual world (holy versus common). Advancement or regression along one track is thought to correspond to the other, so to consecrate something is the spiritual equivalent of cleansing it physically, and profane is the spiritual counterpart of physical defile. Thus an unclean thing is also thought to be immoral, and vice versa.

Both of these models are pervasive and, in some form or another, inform virtually all understandings of the Israelite cult system. The summaries presented here are highly simplified, and there exists a

1See, for example, Gordon J. Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, New International Commentary on the Old Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979), 117.
2Ibid., 19.
considerable amount of meticulous scholarship about movement within the certain levels (especially involving degrees of relative cleanliness or uncleanness), with discussions of, for example, how the various kinds of offerings are used. However, our concern deals less with relative degrees within a state and more with the movements between the states, especially between the state of clean and the state of holy (in either direction). In this regard, both models of the holiness spectrum are highly problematic for several reasons.

First, and most critically, within the structure of the camp there was a rigid access barrier between the sphere of the holy and the sphere of the clean. At a certain point, only the descendants of Levi were allowed access, and at a point not far beyond that only the Aaronides were allowed access (Num 18:2-3). Beyond the curtain into the holy of holies, only the high priest was allowed access, and in very limited circumstances. The distinction was fundamentally based on appointment, either by selection or accident of birth; at some point, no matter how clean you were, you weren’t going in any further, even if you were cleaner than the Aaronides. There was a similar barrier on the border of the camp, specifically against Ammonites and Moabites (Deut 22:3); they were forbidden from the assembly, and the reason had nothing to do with how clean they were.

Second, the reason the Levites were allowed their specialized access was not inherent to anything they were or even consequent on anything they did. The Levites were selected for service in exchange for the firstborn of Egypt (Num 3:11-13), not because they were more moral or otherwise inherently more suitable for sacred service. Likewise, the selection of the Aaronides was arbitrary, “as a gift” (Num 18:7); “Anyone else [other than Aaron and Aaron’s sons] who comes near the sanctuary is to be put to death.” No mention is made of the cleanliness of the approaching individual. The determination of who was or who was not permitted to approach the sanctuary was decided by God and had no basis on merit or cleanliness (although cleanliness is not irrelevant: if the priests performed their duties while unclean [ṭâmēʾ], they would die [Lev 10:6]; if they became ṭâmēʾ even when not performing duties [Lev 21:6-11], they would contaminate [ḥālal] the sanctuary and the priestly office5 and thus require kpr for the sanctuary [Lev 16:13] and themselves [Lev 16:24, 33]). Thus we again assert that holiness is a status conferred by God: “It requires a special act of God to make a thing or person holy.”

The incident in Ex 32:29 is not clearly offered as a warrant for the ordination of the Levites; see Duane Garrett, “Levi, Levites,” in Dictionary of the Old Testament: Pentateuch, ed. T. Desmond Alexander and David W. Baker (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 519. We additionally observe that the event is not mentioned in Num 3; it does not say, “The Levites are mine because they distinguished themselves in the golden calf incident.” The phrase translated “set apart” in the NIV of Ex 32:29 (ml̄î + ’yd) often refers to the ordination of priests (e.g., Judg 17:12), but the Levites who are not sons of Aaron are never made priests. In 1 Chron 29:5 it refers to craftsmen working on the temple, which does not grant them future access to holy space, and in 2 Chron 29:31 the Levites are required to consecrate themselves again, which indicates that they do not have the status by default. The idiom is also used to represent taking up weapons for war, as in 2 Kings 9:24 (NIV “drew”). Whatever is happening in Ex 32, we cannot conclude that the idiom refers to acquiring the privilege of access to holy space. In addition, the form of the word in Ex 32:29 (ml̄î’û + yād using the qal) is different than is normal for the idiom that means “ordained” (ml̄î’û + yād, using the piel). The piel is translated in Num 32:11-12 as “followed wholeheartedly,” but the piel is never used in collocation with yād as in Ex 32:29 and Judg 17:12.

A rabbinic tradition suggests that the miqdāš in Lev 21:11 refers to the priestly office, since priests were not literally confined to the sanctuary: Babylonian Sanhedrin 19a; See discussion in Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 17–22, Anchor Bible (New York: Doubleday, 2000), 1816-17. Others suggest that the command not to leave the sanctuary is not absolute and applies only for the duration of the funeral, and that it is stated in opposition to “attend the funeral” rather than “leave under any circumstances.”

Third, to profane (ḥālal) a holy thing does not reduce its condition to clean (ṭāhôr) or to common (ḥol); the rigid barrier between cleanliness and holiness works in both directions. A common object of ḥālal is Yahweh’s holy name, and Yahweh’s name cannot be said to therefore become common. Ḥālal, then, does not mean “cause a thing to cease to be holy [and become common]” in the same sense that defile (ṭm’) means “cause a thing to cease to be clean [and become unclean].” Ḥālal means “treat a thing that is holy as if it weren’t.” This is an offense that carries consequences (often dire) and that contaminates the profaned holy thing with impurity that must be subsequently removed (kpr), but it does not cause the holy thing to cease to be holy.

The concept of cleanliness (ṭāhôr) is not, therefore, connected with the idea of being not quite pure enough to enter the sanctuary. Rather, it is connected to the idea of suitability for cultic ritual use or participation. Clean (ṭāhôr) means “approved for use or participation in cultic activity.” Holy (qōdeš/qādôš) means “co-identified with deity as part of a divine constellation.” The difference is of kind, not of degree. Holy things remain holy even while profaned (ḥālal), because a thing that is ḥālal does not cease to be holy. Some common things are also suitable for use in the cult. The idea of a gradation of varying levels of progress toward, or away from, holiness, especially when conflated with a gradation between morality and immorality or even purity and impurity, should therefore be discarded; it is too simplistic (and in some cases factually inaccurate) and therefore inherently misleading. Holiness and cleanliness (and uncleanliness) are different statuses that confer (or limit) different privileges for different purposes. But since holiness is not a gradient, it is necessary to reexamine the action that is commonly asserted to signify the transition between the clean and holy states: the verbal form of qdš, often translated “consecrate.” See appendix B for this discussion.

7See Averbeck, “Clean and Unclean,” 482.
Appendix B

Syntactico-Semantic Analysis of Qdš

If we want to understand what words used in the Bible mean, we have to understand what they meant to the people who used them, and the only way to do that is to examine the ways in which they are used. It will not do to simply adopt a particular conception (whether derived from church tradition, from the New Testament, from various disciplines in the human sciences, or from contempt for religion) and assume that it is reflected in the Bible’s teaching just because a quorum of passages can be construed to support it. Many interpreters try to concoct a definition of what holiness means in the abstract, usually by appeals to such things as anthropological or psychological models of human behavior.\(^1\) Many of these models, in turn, operate under the fundamental assumption that religion is universal, essentially interchangeable in any of its manifestations, and fundamentally primitive, used either to justify the bloodlust of perfidious tyrants\(^2\) or to express an unsophisticated and childish wonderment toward the machinery of the cosmos,\(^3\) much as a small child might demonstrate toward trains or construction equipment. This analysis of the text, unfortunately, often serves the purpose of using the text as one example among dozens employed to legitimate the model, rather than using the model to understand the text. Theological systems based on the New Testament are, methodologically speaking, no better. How can we discover what the Old Testament really says if we are only interested in pointing to whichever isolated parts of it happen to correspond with whatever we already knew we wanted it to say?

If we are not going to rely on conceptual models (anthropological or theological), we will have to rely on words and the usage of words. However, there is no word in any cognate language that matches the entire semantic range of Hebrew root qdš; or, at least, if there is, we have not discovered it. However, since meaning is determined by usage and not etymology, it is possible for different forms of the same root to have different meanings if they are used in different ways (compare perhaps the English words pathetic and sympathetic). Such diversification is attested in Hebrew both between noun and verb forms and between the various stems of a Hebrew verb.

As discussed in proposition ten, the use of the adjective qādōš and noun qōdeš is not matched by the Akkadian or Ugaritic cognates of the root qdš, since these never refer to abstractions, time, or entities

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other than the anthropomorphic great gods. The use of the Hebrew adjective and most of the uses of the noun are paralleled by the semantic range of the Sumerian/Akkadian noun/determinative DINGIR. DINGIR, however, can never parallel the semantic range of the verbal forms of Hebrew qdš. On the other hand, the Akkadian and Ugaritic cognate verbal forms do not match the Hebrew verb usage, either; they never take the gods as objects or referents (as the Hebrew verb qdš can take Yahweh as an object or referent), and they can be used in mundane contexts (where Hebrew qdš never is). There is a Sumerian word, however, that refers to the concept of divinity and whose usage, in terms of referents and context, matches almost perfectly with the range of Hebrew qdš that is not paralleled by DINGIR. That word is the adjective ku3, which normally indicates association with the divine realm.

**KU3 AND QDŠ**

Our initial observation is that the entire semantic range of the Hebrew root qdš in all its derived forms is paralleled by the combined semantic ranges of the Sumerian KU3 and DINGIR with only a very few exceptions (mostly related to entities in the divine realm such as chaos creatures, celestial bodies, gods other than Yahweh, and ghosts, which would be dingirized in Sumerian but are not called qdš in Hebrew; these exceptions would be expected given Israel’s theological innovations and are thus explained by context). However, neither of these Sumerian terms can parallel the entire semantic range of Hebrew qdš alone. As E. Jan Wilson notes, the semantic range of KU3 has virtually no overlap with the adjective qādōš, which is especially odd because KU3 is an adjective. The semantic range of KU3 does, however, match some of the usage of the noun qōdeš,5 and we observe the same for many of the referents of the verb qdš, especially in the D (piel) and H (hiphil) stems. We also observe that the semantic ranges of KU3 and DINGIR have very little overlap with each other. While they both refer to things that are in some way connected to the divine realm, DINGIR seems to emphasize the identity of deity or co-identification of an item with deity as part of its constellation (or co-identification with a divine office, in the case of dingirized individual persons). In contrast, KU3 emphasizes association with the divine realm, usually acquired by proximity to the sanctuary or to a ritual. Some locations or objects within the divine realm itself that are not specifically identified with any deity are also called KU3.6 KU3 is almost never used of the gods themselves.7 Qdš, on the other hand, is frequently used for deity, but it is also used of things that do not appear to be strongly co-identified with the deity; a house dedicated to the Lord (Lev 27:14) is qōdeš (noun) but does not become a sanctuary. Further, qdš is commonly used to describe offerings, and the dingirization of offerings in Sumerian texts is unattested. The Hebrew root qdš therefore overlaps, in part, with the semantic range of both KU3 and DINGIR.

In proposition ten we argued that DINGIR and the adjectival form of qdš that parallels it both describe something that is essentially co-identified with deity as part of what Michael Hundley calls a divine constellation.8 We will now examine the relationship between the meanings of the other forms of qdš

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4We will use this heuristic device for reference purposes to refer to anything that can be represented by the divine determinative DINGIR.
5Wilson, Holiness, 88-89.
6Ibid., 20-21.
7Ibid., 30.
and **Ku₃**. **Ku₃** refers to a state of “pertaining or belonging to the divine realm.”⁹ It is very rarely used of the gods¹⁰ and is never used substantively for temples¹¹ (cf. Ex 29:30, where the [noun] **qōdeš** is rendered “holy place”), and as such it does not match the full usage of **qdš**.¹² It is used, however, for temple buildings and festivals¹³ (sacred time; compare to the sabbath in Ex 20:11 [piel]), sacred precincts and offerings,¹⁴ cities and the foundations of buildings,¹⁵ and elements used in rituals and temple service.¹⁶ This list overlaps very closely with the biblical list of things that are said to be dedicated or consecrated (**qdš**, typically in the piel), which are primarily offerings and sanctuary utensils. **Ku₃** is also used to describe the consecration of an army¹⁷ (compare to Josh 3:5), and the status of a priest.¹⁸ Although **Ku₃** is an adjective and **qdš** is (often) a verb, the ideas they represent are virtually synonymous despite the difference in grammar. Wilson in one instance presents **Ku₃** as if it were a verb (“he sanctified”),¹⁹ and the NIV of 1 Chronicles 26:20 translates **qdš** (hiphil) as if it were a substantive adjective (“dedicated things”).

The verb **qdš** does not (normally) describe the process by which a common thing acquires the status represented by the adjective **qdš**. Despite the NIV’s translation of Exodus 30:29 as “consecrate them so that they will be most holy,” the Hebrew is less specific about the chain of causality between the human action and the consequent state. In Jonah 1:12, Jonah instructs the sailors to “throw [him] into the sea . . . and it will become calm.” The grammar in Hebrew is the same, but we understand easily that the action of throwing Jonah into the sea does not cause the sea to become calm in the same sense that stopping the wind does. The sailors perform an action, and then God acts (to stop the storm). As in Exodus 30:29, and so on, even though the syntax suggests a result clause, the two separate verbs indicate two separate events. Event A precedes event B, but that does not mean event A *caused* event B (*post hoc ergo propter hoc*).

Neither Sumerian nor Akkadian has a concept of humans ritually causing something to become a dingir (i.e., co-identified with deity). What they do have, which is superficially similar to the consecration of temple articles, is the ceremony for animating a divine image. Divine images are nonanthropomorphic²⁰ occasional dingir(s) and are therefore co-identified with the deity they represent by being incorporated into the deity’s divine constellation (see full discussion in proposition ten). Nothing in the consecration process, called the “opening of the mouth” ritual, actually fuses the image with the divine personality; that action is done by the god itself when the god accepts the image. The purpose

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⁹Wilson, *Holiness*, 17. It is the rough equivalent to Akkadian *ellu*, but the latter has a broader scope that takes it far outside the range of Hebrew **qdš**.


¹¹Wilson, *Holiness*, 89.

¹²Ibid., 86.

¹³Text 2289 from the Nippur collection of the University of Pennsylvania; Wilson, *Holiness*, 32-34.

¹⁴Ur Excavation Texts VI/I 103, 105, 106; see Wilson, *Holiness*, 17.

¹⁵Wilson, *Holiness*, 35. Based on Gudea Statue B III 12; E II 21-22; C III 6-7; E III 11-12; F III 1-2; Cyl A XIII 12-13, 24-29.

¹⁶Eršemma no. 159, 13-20; Wilson, *Holiness*, 24-25.


¹⁸Šurpu, tablet 1, line 4. See Wilson, *Holiness*, 32.

¹⁹Wilson, *Holiness*, 35.

²⁰In the sense that they are objects, not personalities, even if the objects are roughly human shaped.
of the ritual is to prepare the image to represent the deity, specifically by activating its various orifices—ears, nose, mouth—so that it can hear petitions, smell incense, and consume the sacrifices.21 Throughout the ritual, the phrase is repeated over and over: “May the [image] become ku₃ like heaven.”22 The process of becoming (sanctified) does not result in the (sanctified) object receiving the divine determinative;23 this is not in the range of what ku₃ can mean. What the sanctification does is prepares the image to be incorporated into the constellation of the deity as an extension of the divine identity. The closest the ritual comes to actual deification is at the end, where the priest declares to the image, “From this day let your fate be counted as divinity; among your brother gods may you be counted.”24 Priests, however, do not decree destiny. Making the statue sanctified (ku₃) is not the same process as decreeing a fate of divinity for the statue. The final image is the product of both humans and gods.25 The humans built the statue and consecrated (ku₃) it, but the process by which it becomes a deity (dingir), described by the metaphor of birth, is a different process, performed by the gods.26

Israel’s cultic procedure and accompanying theology are different from Mesopotamia’s, and so its cultic objects may serve different purposes, but the essential meaning of what divinity is and how the divine sphere works remains comparable. Thus despite the differing use of the sacred objects, the process of constructing the sacred objects is similar. In Mesopotamia, after the craftsmen have been appointed by the gods27 (compare Ex 31:1-11) and the object has been manufactured, the object is ritually consecrated (ku₃), and after that it is born into the constellation of the deity it represents and thereby is dingir. Likewise, in Israel the craftsmen are appointed, the object is constructed, the object is ritually consecrated (qdš, usually piel), and after that Yahweh accepts it as part of his constellation and thereby it is holy (adjective qādôš).

Finally, we note a further overlap between ku₃ and verbal forms of qdš in the rare instances where they are used respectively to describe a deity or have a deity as a referent. Normally the concept of associating a deity with the divine realm is redundant, which is why ku₃ is not used for deities. Ku₃ is not used to describe the process by which a deity becomes a dingir; a deity is described as sanctified in order to emphasize the fact of their deity, especially in a context where they are not being given proper recognition.28 In Enki and the World Order, Inanna complains to Enki that she has not been given jurisdiction of mes, which are the prerogative of deity: “Why did you treat me . . . in an exceptional manner? I am holy Inanna [ku₃ .quantum:Inanna me-en]; where are my functions [mes]?”29 Note that ku₃ does

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22Ibid., 1/2B.10, 33, 73, 101.
23Barbara Porter notes that occasional dingirs do not always have the divine determinative even when they are clearly being treated as gods; the lexical component (especially during rituals) is added or removed as an emphasis (Barbara Porter, “Blessings from a Crown, Offerings to a Drum: Were There Non-anthropomorphic Deities in Ancient Mesopotamia?,” in *What Is a God?*, ed. Barbara Nevling Porter [Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2009], 166-67). Images of deities can be dingirized (CAD 16.80a) but normally are not; they do receive offerings, however, and therefore are considered to be dingirs.
26Ibid., 116.
27Ibid., 115.
29Enki and the World Order, *The ETCSL project, Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Oxford*, http://etcsl.orinst.ox.ac.uk/cgi-bin/etcsl .cgi?text=t.1.1.3# (accessed December 18, 2016), lines 391-94.
not replace the DINGIR. Inanna is reminding Enki of her divine status and demanding that it be appropriately acknowledged. As we will see, this usage very closely matches Hebrew contexts where Yahweh is the referent or object of the verb *qdš*.

**Concepts of Divinity from Elsewhere in the Cognitive Environment**

The Akkadian semantic equivalent for *ku₃* is usually considered to be *ellu*. Wilson, however, notes that the semantic ranges do not overlap cleanly; “[*Ellu*] is used in both cultic and non-cultic sense. In a non-cultic sense it can mean freedom from dirt (in the case of clothes) or . . . [impurities in metals].”³⁰ *Ku₃*, on the other hand, never applies to mundane contexts, and neither does Hebrew *qdš*; in Hebrew, cultic purity (and also purity of metals, e.g., Ex 25:11) is represented by *ṭāhôr*. *Ellu* is, however, occasionally used of the gods in a similar manner to *ku₃*,³¹ but Hebrew never refers to Yahweh as *ṭāhôr*. Wilson suggests that Hebrew *ṭāhôr* is closely paralleled by the Sumerian *sikil*, which in turn is sometimes equivalent to Akkadian *ellu*.³² Thus the semantic range of *ellu* is too broad to be usefully compared to *qdš*.³³

The Akkadian cognate of Hebrew *qdš* is *qādašu*. Its semantic range in the D stem overlaps very closely with the piel and hiphil stems of Hebrew *qdš*. It is not, however, ever attested as a translation of *ku₃* (its semantic equivalent in Sumerian is *UD*); it can be used in noncultic sense, as *ku₃* and *qdš* never are,³⁴ and (as a verb) is never used of the gods, as *ku₃* is and as *qdš* (as a verb) also is.

The Ugaritic cognate of Hebrew *qdš* has only one occurrence of the verb (S stem). It otherwise overlaps very closely with *qādašu*. The qal of *qādašu*, however, means “free of [legal] claims,”³⁵ which is unattested in either Ugaritic or Hebrew. In addition, the range of the adjectival forms of both *qādašu* and Ugaritic *qdš* is narrower than it is for the Hebrew adjective *qādôš*, especially in regard to abstract concepts or time.

Of course, Hebrew is not merely translating ideas that the Israelites learned from Mesopotamia. Rather, both cultures are using their own words and ideas to describe something that exists in their shared cognitive environment, with varying emphases and degrees of precision. Therefore, we are not surprised to find similar ideas expressed and described in ancient Near Eastern cultures other than Israel. We can demonstrate the phenomenon of two different linguistic systems within the same cognitive environment using a cognate term to cover different semantic ranges by examining the usage of the word *pants* as it appears in both American and British English. Both American and British cultures have similar conceptions of garments in their cognitive environment, but they use different words to describe those garments, which includes using the same word in different ways. The British semantic equivalent of the American *pants* is *trousers*, while the American semantic equivalent of the British *pants* is *underwear*. In both cases, however, the basic concept of an article of clothing worn around the waist and legs is constant. Thus we can see that the use of a different meaning of a cognate word does not necessarily indicate an ignorance of the concept represented by the other meaning, and neither does it indicate that the usage of the cognate word necessitates that the meanings are the same.

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³⁰Wilson, *Holiness*, 94.
³¹CAD 4.105a.
³²Wilson, *Holiness*, 45.
³³Ibid., 94.
³⁴Jackie Naudé, “*קדשׁ*,” *NIDOTTE*, 3:878.
³⁵CAD 13.46a.
Our decision here to speculate on the equivalents to semantic ranges of Sumerian words is an attempt to bypass the inherent methodological flaws of trying to force Israel’s ideologies into a template derived from a conglomeration of superficial similarities between all other cultures and then speculating on how that template was manifested in Israel, or of trying to force Israel’s ideologies into a template derived from a conglomeration of New Testament theology and two millennia of Christian speculation and then pointing to prooftexts that supposedly demonstrate the presence of that theology in Israel. We are also not suggesting complete interchangeable ideological continuity, dependence, or even polemics. Mesopotamia is not Israel, and vice versa. Nonetheless, they belong to the same cognitive environment, and their respective ideas about the fundamental nature of the divine are going to be far more similar to each other’s ideas than either of them will be to ours.

Trying to understand Old Testament biblical theology based on Christian systematics or skeptical pseudo-sciences is like trying to understand what a GPS is if one only has knowledge of a house-arrest monitor. Undeniably, they use similar technology; in other words, there is an external, logical, and empirically verifiable template that demonstrates their considerable similarity and accounts for most of their features. If a person were only familiar with a house-arrest monitor, though, imagine what he or she would make of the extensive use of GPS in our society, or how he or she would interpret a hypothetical text that reads “God gave each of them a GPS.” The comparison between the two technologies would doubtless lead to many inspirational sermons about shackles and surveillance, about the fear and ignorance that must pervade such a society, and many poignant insights about why so many people carry them in their cars and on their persons, and whether they should do so, and whether God requires it, and whether that requirement makes God evil. Ultimately, however, that person would come to a better understanding of what a GPS is by comparing it to a map, based on documented evidence that they are used in similar circumstances and in similar ways.

Examining usage can provide better understanding of what the purpose of a GPS is and the logic behind the details of its use (i.e., it has nothing whatsoever to do with shackles or surveillance) than examining the technology ever could, but no amount of studying a map will ever enable someone to define the essential nature of a GPS enough to be able to build one. Likewise, comparing qdš to Sumerian words with similar semantic domains won’t tell us anything substantive about the essential nature of the divine realm or of God. This is actually to be expected, because the purpose of the Bible’s teaching is not to describe the metaphysics of divinity, and we know this because none of the words that we use to describe the metaphysics of divinity, whether theological (homoousion, dyophysite, Trinity) or philosophical (unmoved mover, highest being, logically necessary being) are found in the biblical text. Nonetheless, it is not legitimate to say that Yahweh is the same as a Mesopotamian deity because deity is dingir, and Yahweh is qdš, and dingir and qdš mean the same thing, for the same reasons that it is not legitimate to say that if a GPS is like a map, that means a GPS is made out of paper.

Distinguishing Between Which Meaning of Qdš Is Intended Based on Its Form and Context

We modern interpreters, with our (more or less) Aristotelian approach to metaphysics and (essentially) materialist approach to cosmology, and with the rigid and absolute barriers between the mundane and
the divine (what we call the natural and the supernatural) that come with them, and a prevailing interest in what things are made out of, are not in a good position to understand the fundamental essence of what it means to be divine as the ancients understood it. The idea does not exist in our cognitive environment, and we lack the vocabulary to describe it. If we want to try to translate the ancient ideas into our words, then, we cannot start by trying to apply our words (pure, set apart, a god, free from evil spirits, etc.) to those ideas and then using those definitions to speculate on how the ideas were used. Rather, we have to look at how those ideas were used and then perhaps try to extrapolate a definition.

Only God can cause a thing to become divine, but some forms of the verb *qdš* (notably the piel) typically have humans as the subject. In most of these cases, though, the undersubjects of the verb (the things that are consecrated) behave very differently from referents of the predicate adjective *qādôš*; loot donated to the temple is clearly not considered to be in the same class of object as the articles of the temple (i.e., a lampstand or the ark). Priests are consecrated, but persons can be consecrated without becoming priests (1 Sam 16:5). Thus there is a clear difference between the way some things become divine and the way other things become divine.

We moderns might be inclined to ask, does consecration (verbal *qdš*) cause a thing to be divine or not? The question “Does . . . or not?,” however, is a product of our cognitive environment with its rigid categories of metaphysics and therefore has no meaning in the context of the ancient world. What it means to be divine is not even really a category of being as we normally use the term; a divine thing is not (necessarily) supernatural, or numinous, or made out of ether, or anything of that kind. Divinity is a status, but it is not a status of composition or attributes. When I go to the grocery store, I bring my food up to the register, hand money to the cashier, and receive a receipt. Performing this ritual changes the status of the food; it now has the status of mine. No examination of the attributes or properties of the food will indicate the change in ownership, but nonetheless the status is quite real (as anyone trying to leave the store without first acquiring it for their food is liable to discover). The new status of the food also changes in the way I relate to it; I can eat it now, whereas before I could not.

The status of divine, whatever it specifically signifies, appears to more closely resemble the status we call *mine* in concept than it does, say, the status we call *physical*. If scientists found the ark of the covenant and rendered it down into its constituent elements, they would not have anything in the test tubes except wood and gold; nonetheless, the ark is divine. It did not change in composition or attribute, but at some point something happened to it that changed the way people were expected or allowed to interact with it. We observe the same with the referents of the piel of *qdš*: consecration means that people are (at least supposed) to interact with them differently than with an (unconsecrated) object of the same kind. Thus we might say that verbs of *qdš* with human subjects have a *perlocution of treatment*.

But then what does it mean to say that God is the only one who can cause a thing to become divine (i.e., confer a holy status)? The status is the underlying reason that warrants the change in treatment. In the grocery store metaphor, only an employee of the store can confer the status of ownership; I cannot make the food mine by performing a money-exchange ritual with just anybody; nor does it actually become mine simply because I treat it as if it were. Likewise, it is not the ritual itself that produces the

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36Wilson, *Holiness*, 82.
status; an employee of the store can confer the status of mine (i.e., can give it to me) simply by declaring it to be so.

The ancient world does not think in terms of Aristotelian metaphysical categories; it has no words to describe whether a thing is divine, in the sense of a category that we could put it in to distinguish it from something that is not divine. What the ancient world does have is terms for is co-identification and propriety. A human cannot confer divine status, but a human can demand one kind of treatment for a thing instead of another. Whether or not God endorses the consecration by conferring the status is not a question that the text addresses, because the thinking that produces the question is not part of the cognitive environment of the authors and consequently would have no meaning for them.

The status of co-identified with Yahweh (or with a divine office), however, is different from the status of (merely) divine. The differences between the two statuses are what is signified in Sumerian by the difference between ku₃ and dingir, although what that exactly consists of (and what exactly is the essential difference between either of them and things with the status we would call ordinary or mundane) is never described in the text because the authors do not think in those terms. Further, it is not likely that any of our words could describe it precisely or simply, since our cognitive environment (from which our words draw their meanings) has no conception of the ancient idea of divinity. Even the minimal words necessary for basic communication (treatment and [co]-identity) may not be substantively accurate; thus we will identify parallel usage to dingir and ku₃ where possible. Nonetheless, it ought to be possible to describe the idea of divinity (if not define it), however circuitously. At the very least, we would imagine that we should be able to distinguish between co-identification (dingir) and treatment (ku₃) based on usage. This distinction is what we will now attempt.

**Attribute or substantive adjective (qādōš) (lit. “the divine thing”).** A thing modified by (or represented by the substantive of) the adjective qādōš is always co-identified with Yahweh as part of his constellation (or co-identified with a divine office in the case of individual persons), and thus always would be represented in Sumerian with a dingir. The various categories of objects presented in this way are discussed in proposition ten. Some things in Yahweh’s constellation are not consistently called holy; this means that the holy status is not being emphasized in context. This is consistent with the Sumerian use of the dingir determinative, as discussed in propositions ten and eleven.

Because modern English has no words to accurately encapsulate the meaning of the ancient concept of divine, we will describe the various relationships with the divine using a metaphor of an electric fence. In this metaphor, the aspect of co-identification with deity (represented in Sumerian by dingir) will be represented by the connection of the fence with the power supply. This is a condition that can only be brought about by God. The aspect of association with the divine realm (represented in Sumerian by ku₃) will be represented by the presence of a “high voltage” sign on the fence. Association is described in terms of propriety (i.e., a perlocution of treatment). Co-identification always confers association and always commands propriety. In this metaphor, the limited interest of the ancient cognitive environment is represented by having no emphasis on whether the metal actually has an electric charge running through it; electricity represents the metaphysical essence of divinity, which is of considerable interest to us and of no interest at all to the ancient authors.
In our metaphor, the substantive or attributive adjectival form would be used to say “the fence that is connected to the power supply.”

**Predicate adjective** (ḥāyâ + qâdôš) (**lit. “the thing is divine”*/“the thing will become divine”). The predicate adjective is semantically similar to a stative verb. It indicates that the object is transformed into a state where it can be described by the adjective. Therefore, like the other adjectival forms, it always indicates co-identification either with a divine office or with Yahweh by indicating incorporation into his constellation. Accordingly, the object always would be accompanied in Sumerian by a DINGIR.

In our metaphor, this form would be used to say “The fence is connected to the power supply.”

**Niphal** (niqdaš) (**lit. “the thing becomes divine”). The action represented by this form changes depending on whether God is the referent. If the referent is not God, the illocution is (co)-identification, and the perlocution is transformation of the object into something that can be described by the adjective (and therefore the object would be translated in Sumerian with a DINGIR). This usage occurs only once, with the tent of meeting as the referent (Ex 29:43: “the place will be niqdaš by my glory”); God is specified as the agent by the ʾ b preposition. The same meaning could be achieved by use of the predicate adjective (“I will meet you there, and the place will be qâdôš”), but the actual process of transformation (and co-identification) is emphasized for theological reasons, both in terms of covenant significance and paradigm shift in God’s relationship to humanity.

If the referent is God (the remainder of the niphal occurrences), the illocution is demonstration, and the perlocution is acknowledgment: “I will become holy [in the perception of whoever the speech-act is directed toward].” The reality of Yahweh’s divine status is not being created; rather, it is being extended from the world (where it exists by default) into the minds of those who see the demonstration (where it might not exist, if they do not perceive the world accurately). In every instance except one the verb is in collocation with a ʾ b preposition, which means “by” or “through.” The preposition refers to the medium through which the demonstration is made (e.g., Is 5:16, “through righteousness,” NIV “by his righteous acts”). Occasionally the persons performing the acknowledgment will also be specified; in Ezekiel 20:41 (also Ezek 28:22, 25; 36:23; 38:16; 39:27), Yahweh is niqdaš “through [Israel]” (ʾ b preposition indicates medium of demonstration) “in the sight of the nations” (where the nations are the ones doing the acknowledging). The perlocution changes based on the referent because it would not make sense to say that a deity is transformed into a divine status. The same redundant identification appears in the Sumerian usage of KU₃ for deities, with the same emphasis on existing status with a perlocution of acknowledgment. Thus it appears that the referent of the niphal would be translated in Sumerian by both KU₃ and DINGIR together, just as KU₃ and DINGIR are used together with Inanna in Enki and the World Order.

In our metaphor, this form would be used to say “The fence is being connected to the power supply” (perlocution of transformation) or “This fence is connected to a power supply! See the sign?” (perlocution of acknowledgment).

**Piel** (qiddēš) (**lit. “X causes the thing to be divine”). The piel of qdš always has an illocution of declaration and a perlocution of treatment. Whether the undersubject is co-identified with Yahweh depends on what it is. We know that the piel does not automatically produce a co-identified status, be-

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37 The exception is Lev 22:32, where the preposition is ʾ bətôk, “among.” In this case the Israelites are still the medium because acknowledgment is being made by those who observe Yahweh among the Israelites (compare Yahweh as the referent of the hithpael).
cause this is a status that only God can confer, and the piel often has a human subject; additionally, many of the objects of the piel are offerings, and there is no attestation in Sumerian of dingirized (co-identified with deity) offerings. The list of referents of the piel does, however, overlap almost perfectly with the list of things designated in Sumerian as \textit{ku₃}, even when those things are also \textit{dingirs} (most notably cultic images). Thus we should assume that the piel of \textit{qdš} brings about the status that would be translated as \textit{ku₃}, which emphasizes propriety.

There are three instances where Yahweh is the subject of the piel, and in all cases the referent is something that is elsewhere modified by the adjective; the sabbath in Exodus 20:11 (modified by the adjective in Is 58:13), priests in Leviticus 21:8, 15 (modified by the adjective in Lev 21:6), and the nation of Israel in, for example, Leviticus 20:8 (modified by the adjective in Ex 19:6). It is not therefore clear whether the piel with God as the agent signifies co-identification. The difference, however, is somewhat academic: “treat the thing co-identified with deity in a matter befitting the divine” is not significantly different from “treat the thing in a manner befitting the divine because it is now co-identified with deity.”

We will note, however, that the sabbath’s status is normally acknowledged by treatment (i.e., “remember the Sabbath day by keeping it holy” [piel] in Ex 20:8), and that the repeated assertions of “I the Lord am holy—I who make you [the priests] holy” in Leviticus 21 is in a context of how priests should treat themselves (i.e., behave). Therefore the piel still appears to emphasize treatment over identity, which would also explain why authors choose to use it in place of the niphal (which emphasizes the status of co-identity).

In our metaphor, this form would be used to say, “I put a ‘high voltage’ sign on the fence (so that people wouldn’t climb on it).”

\textbf{Noun (qōdeš) (lit. “the divine thing”).} The noun represents a category and can designate anything that is modified by the adjective, is the referent of the predicate adjective or stative verb, or is the object of the perlocution of any of the verbal forms (i.e., the thing that is transformed, is acknowledged, is treated, etc.). As such, it could be translated into Sumerian with either a \textit{ku₃} or a \textit{dingir} depending on context; in Leviticus 27:14 it is the object of the perlocution of a piel (and thus means “a thing that is to be treated as divine”), but in Numbers 4:20 it refers to the articles of the tabernacle, which are designated with the adjective (and thus means “the things that are co-identified with Yahweh”). The most notable usage is when it is used by itself to represent the nave of the temple, the holy place. Does this mean that the real estate is co-identified with Yahweh, or only that access to the area is restricted out of propriety? In some sense the distinction is academic, but we will note that the semantic range of the derivative term \textit{miqdāš} (“sanctuary”) overlaps entirely with the semantic range of \textit{dingir},\textsuperscript{38} and the holy place is part of the sanctuary. Therefore, we would tentatively propose that the noun \textit{qōdeš} should be considered to indicate co-identity (i.e., a thing that would be translated in Sumerian as \textit{dingir}) unless context indicates that this is unlikely, either because of an attendant verb or because the dingirization of the specified category of object is unattested in Sumerian or Akkadian.

\textsuperscript{38}A possible exception comes from the use in Num 18:29 (NIV “holiest part”; there is no attestation of dingirized offerings), but the text is problematic (and nowhere else is \textit{miqdāš} used as an adjective). In Lev 26:31 and Amos 7:13 it refers to illegitimate cultic sites, but cultic sites can still be \textit{dingir} (co-identified with deity). Whether the \textit{miqdāš} in question is co-identified with Yahweh, illegitimately thought to be co-identified with Yahweh, or co-identified with deity other than Yahweh varies by context, but only legitimate sanctuaries are ever also designated by the noun \textit{qōdeš}. 
In our metaphor, this form would be used to say “the electric fence,” as in a broad categorical designation for either “the fence that has a ‘high voltage’ sign on it” or “the fence that is connected to a power supply” (or both). Remember, however, that there is no word to indicate “a fence that is charged with an electric current.”

“Most holy” (qōdeš haqqādāšîm) (lit. “the more divine thing”). By default, this grammatical construction (root + repeated root with a definite article and masculine plural ending) is interpreted as a superlative, but the usage can be idiomatic and varies by context. When referring to a status, the form can be used to indicate a higher degree of the status: Jeremiah 3:19 refers to the “most beautiful land” (NIV “most beautiful inheritance”), indicating a thing that is more beautiful than an ordinary beautiful thing. In the context of the holiness spectrum, “most holy” is commonly thought to represent a superlative state of holiness (i.e., the apse of the temple, the holy of holies, or most holy place is holier than the nave, the holy place). Thus a most holy thing is often thought to be more holy than an ordinary holy thing. The biggest problem with this interpretation, apart from the other difficulties related to the holiness spectrum as a concept (see appendix A), is that God is never referred to as most holy. It would be very odd to say that the most holy altar is more holy than holy Yahweh. The same problem occurs with the other common use of the superlative, meaning “best/most distinctive of its kind” (i.e., “song of songs”); the altar is not superlative to Yahweh in any meaningful sense. However, the construction can also be employed to emphasize the indicated status. Ecclesiastes 1:2 (“vanity of vanities”; NIV “utterly meaningless”) does not mean “this thing I describe is the most meaningless thing” or even “this thing is more meaningless than other meaningless things”; what it means is “this thing is utterly meaningless.” Further, context indicates that a special degree of treatment for things designated most holy is always near the forefront. Access to the most holy place is strictly controlled, though we would not say that access requires a higher level of purity; the high priest has higher expectations of cleanliness than lower priests (Lev 21:10–13), but even he is limited in his approach to the most holy place no matter how clean he is (Lev 16:2). Further, only the officiating priest and his family can eat the most holy sin offering (Lev 6:29), but any of the Aaronides can eat the most holy grain offering (Lev 6:18), with no mention of relative cleanliness. We might say, then, that the most holy things require a higher level of care in their treatment than holy things of a similar class. Yahweh is in a class by himself and already requires the highest possible care in treatment, so calling Yahweh “most holy” would be redundant, but everything else needs to be designated when a higher level of care is required.

In our metaphor, this form would be used to say, “that fence has a sign indicating a very high voltage and therefore needs to be treated extremely carefully.”

Qal (qādaš) (lit. “the thing is divine”/“the thing will become divine”). The qal is the active indicative, here in reference to a stative verb. The usage is complex, but the act of declaring a thing to be qādaš appears to have a perlocution of treatment. This reading can be substantiated by three lines of reasoning.

First, when the referent is specified, it is usually an object: censers (Num 16:38), produce (Deut 22:9), food (Hag 2:12), or the garments of the priests (Ex 29:21). The only exception is the priests themselves,

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39 For example, Ezek 26:7 refers to Nebuchadnezzar as "king of kings" (mlk mlkym) to say that he is king over those who are themselves kings (see also Num 3:32), but Gen 9:25, where Ham is called "slave of slaves" (NIV "lowest of slaves"), does not mean that Ham will be a slave owned by those who are themselves slaves.

who are listed alongside their garments and thus probably not indicated as agents. Holiness is a state, not an action, and the only way an object without agency can be something is through interaction with the things around it. Thus its being holy refers to how it is interacted with; hence treatment.

Second, there is some debate about whether the phrase in, for example, Leviticus 6:27 should be translated “anything that it touches must be holy” (e.g., NCV), as opposed to the more common “whatever touches [it] will become holy” (e.g., NIV). With a perlocution of treatment, however, the distinction becomes academic even in those instances where either option is theoretically possible: “whoever touches [it] must be [treated as] holy” means essentially the same thing as “whoever it touches will become [a thing that must be treated as] holy” (as opposed to the difference between “it must have a holy status” and “it will acquire a holy status”).

Third, the perlocution of treatment helps to explain why this form is used instead of another. When an object takes on a new status (referred to grammatically as ingression), the emphasis on its existence in its new state is represented by perfect tense of the qal (“it became”), while the emphasis on its acquiring the state is normally represented by the niphal (“it was [made]”). Thus, if an emphasis on transformation were intended, we would logically expect to see a niphal. In addition, some text variants reinterpret the form in Exodus 29:21 as a piel (see also Ezek 44:19, also a piel), which, as we have seen, also has an emphasis on treatment. Similarly, an emphasis on treatment would explain the decision to use a qal instead of a predicate adjective (which emphasizes co-identity). Finally, the qal can be used instead of the piel for semantic reasons, because the piel specifies an agent and the qal does not (stative versus factitive construction).

In our metaphor, this form would be used to say, “That thing should be treated in the same way you would treat an electric fence.” Once again, depending on context, electric can mean either “the fence connected to a power supply” or “the fence with a ‘high voltage’ sign on it.”

**Hiphil (hiqdîš) (lit. “X makes the thing divine”).** Hiphil is typically the causative form of a verb. In the case of *qdš*, the hiphil, like the piel, almost always occurs with a human subject and therefore has a perlocution of treatment. The difference between the piel and the hiphil stem is the difference between a passive and an active undersubject. However, as was the case with the qal, the referent is almost

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42 The rendering of the jussive of a stative verb is “let it be” (Bruce K. Waltke and M. O’Connor, *An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax* [Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990], 30.5.3c).

43 Waltke and O’Connor suggest that the perfective qal of a stative verb emphasizes the presence of the object in its state, while the passive (niphal) emphasizes the process by which it acquired the state. Waltke and O’Connor, *Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax*, 31.4g.

44 There are only six stative verbs besides *qdš* that appear in both qal and niphal forms: *hlh*, *tmʾ*, *yrʾ*, *plʾ*, *pws*, and *šmm*. In most of these, the niphal means “become [the state represented by the qal],” i.e., *hlh* (qal) means “is sick,” and *hlh* (niphal) means “becomes sick.” In the case of *yrʾ*, however, the meaning changes. *Yrʾ* (qal) means “is afraid,” but *yrʾ* (niphal) does not mean “becomes afraid,” as would be expected. Rather, *yrʾ* (niphal) means “is a thing that inspires fear.” This indicates that it is not without precedent for different stems of stative verbs to follow divergent semantic paths that deviate from the paradigmatic stem templates (in this case, reverse its perlocution: “you will become afraid” [expected based on stem template] means the opposite of “you will inspire fear” [actual based on usage]).

45 Samaritan Pentateuch.

46 The form also appears in Is 65:5, but the passage contains numerous interpretation issues involving alternate pointings or variant spellings (unrelated to *qdš*), and its exact meaning cannot be determined with enough certainty to either support or undermine any speculation about the broader meaning of *qdš*. For a discussion of possible interpretations and their difficulties, see Joseph Blenkinsopp, *Isaiah 56–66*, Anchor Bible (New York: Doubleday, 2003), 272; see also Shalom M. Paul, *Isaiah 40–66*, Eerdmans Critical Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), 595.

47 Meaning specifically the object in the case of the qal and the undersubject in the case of the hiphil.
always inanimate, and even when it isn’t (as in the dedicated firstborn), it is still being treated as an object, not as an agent. Therefore, as with the qal, the difference between being treated as holy and interacting with things as a holy thing would is academic. This then prompts us to ask, though, why the authors would choose to use the hiphil instead of the piel.

Our first inclination would be to question the perlocution and to ask whether it shouldn’t represent transformation (the intuitive meaning of causation), as the niphal does. However, in regard to stative verbs, the difference between the hiphil and the niphal stem is that the niphal is used to say “[thing] becomes [state],” while the hiphil represents someone causing (thing) to act as if it were (state). The significant difference in meaning is appearance versus essence. If someone becomes strong (represented by a niphal form), it means they build up their muscles so that they possess the attribute of strength innately. If I make someone act as if they were strong (represented by a hiphil form), it means I got them to pick up a heavy object. The hiphil does not demonstrate what a thing is but rather what a thing does, and what an object without agency in a particular state does is “be interacted with by things around it.” Combined with the human subject of the verb, we must conclude that the hiphil does indeed have a perlocution of treatment.

The hiphil of qdš occurs thirty-four times, mostly in the same kinds of circumstances as the piel. The difference between a piel form and a hiphil form normally is that the hiphil indicates the activity of the undersubject. However, since the activity of the inert referent of a stative verb is limited to interaction, what it does consists entirely of what is done to it. Emphasizing the activity of its interaction, therefore, is a way of emphasizing what that interaction ought to be. Thus, in every case of the hiphil, the undersubject is something that someone (often explicitly) might be disinclined to treat as divine, or has failed to treat as divine, or something that it is not intuitive to treat as divine, even though the verb demands that they should. Perhaps most notable are the items that a person dedicates and wishes to redeem (Lev 27:14–26; also the firstborn in Lev 27:26; Num 8:17; 33:13; Deut 15:19); redeem in this context is essentially the opposite of dedicate in the sense that a redeemed thing no longer requires treatment befitting a thing that is divine. Thus, “wants to redeem” means “does not want to treat as divine anymore.” Other uses continue the trend. The temple that Yahweh has consecrated is defiled (2 Chron 36:14; anticipated in 2 Chron 2:4; 17:16; 20; 1 Kings 9:3, 7). David dedicates plunder and tribute to the temple in 2 Samuel 8:11 (see also 1 Chron 26:26–28), but all of it is taken and given in tribute to Hazael by Joash in 2 Kings 12:18. Silver in Judges 17:3 is dedicated and used to make an idol. In Leviticus 22:2 the priests are reminded that they must respect the dedicated things. First Chronicles 23:13 reminds the postexilic audience that the Aaronides were supposed to consecrate the holy things but often did not. Hezekiah consecrates the (profaned) temple as

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48 See Waltke and O’Connor’s treatment of the verbal system in *Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax*, chap. 21.
49 Notwithstanding the (in this case) semantic difference between the presence or absence of the undersubject. For some roots this might matter, but the niphal of qdš always adds agency (represented in applicable constructions by a primary subject) with a b preposition. “The place will be consecrated by [means of] my glory” (Ex 29:43, niphal) means the same thing as “my glory will cause the place to become holy” (b of mechanism rephrased into a construction containing both a subject and undersubject).
50 Exodus 28:38 designates Aaron to “bear the guilt [ʿāwôn]” of the holy things that the Israelites consecrate (hiphil). The ʿāwôn does not belong to the holy things in the same way that it belongs to the land in Lev 18:25 because the grammar is different, which makes sense because consequence usually falls on the people presenting the offering (e.g., Korah in Num 16), not on the things offered. The original possessors of the ʿāwôn were therefore probably the Israelites, presumably incurred by the act of consecrating the object. The fact that this action incurs a consequence indicates that it was done improperly, hence the use of the hiphil to indicate improper treatment. However, like Lev 18:25, the emphasis is on the result of the consequence rather than the cause; the ʿāwôn will be transferred to Aaron “so that [the improperly consecrated gifts] will be acceptable to the Lord.”
part of his reforms in 2 Chronicles 30:8. In Jeremiah 12:3 an army is consecrated in anticipation of accompanying the divine vanguard (see discussion on the hithpael), but what is unexpected is that the army is going into battle in order to lose (“qdš them for the day of slaughter” is paralleled with “drag them off like sheep to be butchered”). An army may also be the imagery of the metaphor in Zephaniah 1:7, though it might also be a reference to the Day of the Lord as a sacred festival. The hiphil in either case indicates that the participants in the occasion are not those who the audience expects, whether that consists of an enemy army (who will carry out the sacrifice; compare Is 34:6) or simply celebrants other than themselves.

Other examples are when the undersubject is Yahweh or Yahweh’s name, which always occurs in the context of rebellion or apostasy. Numbers 20:12; 27:14 refer to Moses and Aaron failing to “honor [God] as holy”; in Isaiah 8:13 Yahweh’s name ought to be regarded as holy; and in Isaiah 29:23 Israel will “acknowledge [Yahweh’s] holiness.” As we saw in the case of the niphal, treatment of Yahweh has a perlocution of acknowledgment. It is interesting to note, however, that in Numbers 20:13, God was made holy (niphal) at the waters of Meribah, but in regard to the same event, Moses and Aaron did not cause him to be made holy (hiphil; Num 20:13 specifies that the medium of acknowledgment was the waters). In this instance, the hiphil emphasizes the absence of what is produced by the niphal, that is, proper acknowledgment. This is the clearest indication that the hiphil is used to emphasize (the necessity of) the proper treatment that is due to the referent by virtue of its holy status.

In our metaphor, this form would be used to say “I put a ‘high voltage’ sign on the fence (because people will want to climb on it)” (perlocution of treatment) or “if you climb the fence you will see that it is connected to the power supply” (perlocution of acknowledgment).

**Further considerations in the d and h stems.** Qdš occurs five times in the pual (2 Chron 26:18; 31:6; Ezra 3:5; Is 13:3; Ezek 48:11), always with similar referents to the piel (the Aaronides, the firstborn, the appointed festivals, an army, and the priests, respectively). The pual is thus the passive of the piel, as expected. There are no occurrences of qdš in the hophal.

In 1 Samuel 16:5, the piel occurs immediately following a hithpael; in 2 Chronicles 30:17 a hiphil occurs immediately following the hithpael. In both of these cases the meaning seems to be a semantic variation on the usage of the hithpael (active versus reflexive subject). Thus it is possible for a piel or hiphil to be used in place of a hithpael in certain contexts. Piel, pual, hiphil, and hithpael all have

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51 The reference to an army is not explicit but can be inferred. The word translated “slaughter” (for which Jeremiah’s enemies are prepared, Hebrew hrgh) is used two other times in Jeremiah to refer to the Hinnom Valley (Jer 7:32; 19:6) after it is filled with Israel’s dead, implicitly from the attack of the Babylonian army (compare Ezek 21:8-25); the valley is also filled with casualties of battle in Ezek 39:31 (Gog’s army). Jeremiah’s imagery is a metaphor no matter what it represents (Jeremiah’s enemies are not soldiers, but they are not sheep, either), but he appears to be using the imagery of the consecration of an army to wish for his enemies to be killed (in battle).

52 A pair of unusual cases are the consecration of Levitical cities in Josh 20:7 (see Josh 21:32) and Neh 12:47, and also the consecration of Jeremiah in Jer 1:5 (both NIV “set apart”). Tracts of land that are not the sanctuary (most notably in the Hebrew Bible the entire land of Israel) and individuals who are not the priests can be co-identified with deities, but they interact with their surroundings differently from holy individuals and holy ground because access is not restricted; nonetheless, because they are co-identified with deity, treatment of them reflects treatment of deity, in the same way that treatment of a country’s flag represents treatment of the country. The land is also referenced with the adjective (Zech 2:12; also as a miqdāš in Ex 15:17, as is a prophet in 2 Kings 4:9), and its treatment is very similar to documented treatment of noncultic occasional dingirs and also nondingirized components of divine constellations (nations and cities), in Mesopotamia. Co-identification warrants a particular treatment, and neither the Levitical cities nor the prophet Jeremiah were treated as they should have been; the cities were not used in a way that presented a favorable reputation for Yahweh (the purpose of the holifying of the land), and Jeremiah was not respected as a messenger carrying the word of God. Alternatively, the hiphil could indicate that the consecrated object nonetheless remains in the earthly realm. Either option is consistent with usage even if the specific logic cannot be determined with certainty.
perlocutions of treatment, so in most cases the distinction is academic, but the warrant and underlying logic for the treatment can vary by context (especially when the referent is unconventional or uninitiative), so the possibility is nonetheless worth noting.

**Hithpael (hithqaddeš) (lit. “X causes itself to be [considered] divine”).** The hithpael stem has a reflexive subject and a passive undersubject (lit. “makes itself to be”) and in regard to a stative verb signifies declaration or consideration. The hithpael of qdš often has a human subject, which, because only God can confer divine status, indicates a perlocution of treatment. How a thing is treated as divine in these contexts depends on what it is, but more importantly it depends on who is doing the considering.

Most of the usage of the hithpael of qdš concerns the Israelite army (or camp) consecrating itself in preparation for contact with divine presence, either because God is coming among them to perform signs and wonders (Ex 19:22; Num 11:18, Josh 3:5) or to render a decision (Josh 7:3; 1 Sam 16:5), or it concerns individuals preparing for contact with holy objects or holy ground (the ark in 1 Chron 15:12, 14; the inside of the temple in 2 Chron 29:5, 13 [see 2 Chron 29:16]; 31:18). The referents in these cases are individuals; communal abstractions cannot abstain from sexual relations, and in Exodus 19:22 the priests are singled out and specified despite their co-identity with a divine office. Contact with divine presence or holy objects can be fatal; Exodus 19:22 threatens death explicitly, and we see it happen in Num 11:33. What the individuals consecrating themselves are hoping for is that the divine presence they encounter will treat them as if they were themselves divine; that is, it will not kill them.

Alternatively, we might note that this use of the hithpael is a semantic variant (i.e., a reflexive subject) of a particular use of the piel that refers to the consecration of an army prior to battle (Jer 6:4; 22:7; 51:27-28; Joel 3:9; Mic 3:5; also Is 13:3, pual). What exactly this signifies is difficult to determine because the consecration of an army does not closely resemble the consecration of any other object, individual, or community. The soldiers might merely be preparing for contact with the presence of the divine warriors, but it is also theoretically possible that the soldiers themselves are therefore considered to be consecrated (in the same sense as objects placed in the temple) by virtue of their proximity to the divine vanguard.

Armies can be described as ku3, so this would be consistent with the semantic range, even if the internal logic is unclear (and perhaps even idiomatic, although David wants to take this status literally in 1 Sam 21:5). Alternatively, given the metaphor of war as sacrifice (i.e., Is 34:6; Ezek 39:17), soldiers might be metaphorically referred to as priests, although idiomatic or metaphoric usage should be concluded only as a last resort (or if implied from context, e.g., Jer 12:4; Zeph 1:7; see discussion on the hiphil). It might also be possible that the army is seen as an instrument of the gods, although we would expect the instruments of the god to be co-identified with god who wields them and therefore dingirized, as the weapons of the divine warriors are and as the king (or prince) who leads the army can be. However, there is no attestation of dingirized armies; further, these interpretations do not

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54Also includes an anomalous usage of the piel, here with the same meaning as the hithpael but active instead of reflexive. Jesse and his sons consider themselves holy, and Samuel also considers them holy. The divine presence is indicated in 1 Sam 16:6: “the Lord’s anointed stands here before the Lord” (NIV).
explain the self-consecration of the Israelite camp in nonbattle contexts. Thus preparing for contact with the presence of the divine vanguard seems to be the best explanation. Therefore we should read the piel when the referent is an army to be a semantic variant of the hithpael, not the other way around (although once again the difference is mostly academic).

Another similar usage concerns individuals who are not commonly the referents of the piel consecrating themselves, often alongside cult personnel who have consecrated themselves for duties that do not typically require it. The occasions where this occurs are all in 2 Chronicles: the arrival of the ark in Solomon’s temple (2 Chron 5:11); Hezekiah’s rededication of the temple (2 Chron 29:31, 34), and the celebration of the Passover by both Hezekiah and Josiah (2 Chron 30:17; 35:6). While these occasions do not report the manifestation of divine presence, they are nonetheless monumental cult festivals, and thus what is being considered holy is not really themselves but the occasion; they are consecrating sacred time. The holiness that they are contacting is the holy occasion. Contact with sacred time is not fatal (though abusing it can be, Num 15:35), but the occasions warranting consecration are being emphasized for the extremity of their holiness (compare the reading of the law in Neh 8:11). The persons are behaving as if they were about to contact divine presence in acknowledgment of the superlative significance of the occasion. This extreme piety is invoked sarcastically in Isaiah 66:17, where the sacred feast consists of unclean animals.

On one occasion the referent is God (Ezek 38:23). This usage parallels the use of the niphal in Ezekiel, but the mechanism (normally expressed by the b preposition) is now Yahweh’s own action, and so the clumsy “I will be [considered] holy by means of me” is simply rendered reflexive (“I will cause myself to be considered holy”). As with the niphal, the perlocution is therefore acknowledgment.

A different kind of usage occurs in Leviticus 11:44; 20:7, where the referent is the communal abstraction of Israel. Because the communal abstraction is holy (adjective), treatment includes acknowledgment, just as it does when Yahweh is the referent (when the referent is individuals who are not in fact holy, acknowledgment is not possible). The context indicates that the one doing the considering is Yahweh. By keeping the decrees and following them (Lev 20:8), specifically by avoiding uncleanness (Lev 11:44; perhaps also 2 Sam 11:4), the aggregate of individuals will cause themselves to be considered holy—that is, the community they collectively define will be considered (by Yahweh) to represent a favorable reflection of divine identity.

At this point the metaphor we have been using breaks down somewhat; fences have no agency and so cannot serve as reflexive subjects. In the case of God, the action represented would be like the fence demonstrating its connection to the power supply by throwing sparks. In the case of the army or the Israelite community, the actions they take to cause themselves to be considered holy would be represented by taking care to remain isolated from the ground when touching the fence, so that the power supply considers them to be part of the fence by not grounding a current through them.

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58 Also includes an anomalous use of the hiphil in 2 Chron 30:17. The context of emphasis is on treatment as appropriate for the hiphil (the Levites were required to help the priests in order to preserve propriety), but paschal lambs are not offerings and do not normally require consecration of any kind (Ex 12:6).

59 This is potentially supported by the consecration of (persons for) a (sacred) festival in Is 30:29, though the passage is difficult.
Appendix C

Joshua 10:12-15 and Mesopotamian Celestial Omen Texts

In Joshua 10 the coalition of Amorite cities in southern Palestine decides to attack the fortified town of Gibeon. The people from Gibeon had recently made a treaty with the Israelites that the Amorites considered an act of treachery. From a tactical standpoint, the proposed strike would arguably be punitive as well as being an attempt to prevent the Israelites from having access to this strategically located, fortified city. When Joshua receives word that Gibeon is under siege, he gathers the Israelites for an all-night forced march (uphill!) in order to execute a surprise lightning strike on the attacking Amorites. The fifteen-mile march would have taxed the endurance of his soldiers, and they would have lost a night’s sleep. Joshua was desperate for divine intervention, and his daring prayer, along with its results, is recorded in Joshua 10:12-15.

The nature of Joshua’s request has been interpreted in a number of different ways. The earliest interpretation is represented in the Wisdom of Sirach: “Was not the sun stayed by his hand, and one day increased to two?” (Sir 46:4) and elaborated by Josephus: “Moreover it happened that the day was lengthened, that the night might not come on too soon, and be an obstruction to the zeal of the Hebrews in pursuing their enemies.” The belief that the length of the day was actually increased (presumably by the slowing of the earth’s rotation) was maintained throughout history, being affirmed by the Septuagint translators, Augustine, Jerome, Calvin, and Luther. The Jewish rabbinic writers likewise agreed (see Babylonian Sukkah 28a), though Maimonides argued for the interpretation that the day merely appeared to be longer. Apparently, alternate interpretations did not become prevalent until the nineteenth century. C. F. Keil, a conservative, provided an early alternative explanation: because of the lack of ability of the Israelites to measure the length of the day, he concluded that the day appeared to be longer because of all that they were able to accomplish. In the twentieth century, another theory was proposed, that the heat of the sun was diminished in order for the Israelites to be able to accomplish their task.

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2Estimate only, since the specific location of Gilgal remains uncertain.
4Augustine, City of God 21.8; Jerome, Against Jovinianus 2.15, and in the Vulgate translation; John Calvin, Commentary on Joshua (repr., Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1949), 154: the sun was on the western horizon and was prevented from setting; Martin Luther, Commentary on Habakkuk, in Luther’s Works 19, ed. H. C. Oswald (St. Louis: Concordia, 1974), 3.
5Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed 35.
Undoubtedly, some modern interpreters have found the traditional view unacceptable on scientific grounds. Either their presuppositions rule out the supernatural altogether, or they find the magnitude of such a miracle beyond comprehension and unnecessary to explain the victory recorded in the text. Yet even for some conservatives, such as Keil, the details of the text suggest that the traditional interpretation is also inadequate.

In this regard an important observation needs to be made concerning the details of the text: the text clearly identifies the sun as being over Gibeon and the moon as being over the valley of Aijalon. This description places the sun in the east and the moon in the west, thus indicating that the prayer was made in the morning. In the traditional interpretation, it is assumed that dusk was approaching and that, by requesting extended light, Joshua wanted to be able to maintain the momentum that his army had gained. This logic is lost if the prayer was made in the morning. An interpreter would have to ask why Joshua was requesting an extension of daylight if the battle had not yet begun. The interpretation offered here will suggest that he was not asking for extended daylight at all.

One must return to the text, then, to discover what its language and logic suggest Joshua intended when he addressed the sun and moon. If it was still morning, what could Joshua have had in mind? How could the sun and moon have any impact on the outcome of the battle? Methodologically, if we are to read the text as understood by the ancient Israelites, we must turn our attention away from modern physics, since none of that would have been familiar in the ancient context. Instead we will look at the ancient cognitive environment and the context in which the people would think about the movements of the sun and moon. We find an abundance of material to inform us when we recognize the importance of the sun and moon for battle in celestial omen texts from Mesopotamia. Most importantly, we find texts that speak of the sun and moon (as well as the planets) stopping, standing, and waiting. We may examine these documents, then, for clues about what an ancient text might mean by this language rather than simply assuming that we should understand the terms from the world of modern physics. Examination of these texts reveals a significant relationship between the movements of the sun and the moon and military activity.

We can begin with a study of the way people calculated the calendar in the ancient world. Ancient societies used a lunar calendar, periodically adjusted to the solar year by the addition of an extra month. The beginning of a month was calculated by the first appearance of the new moon. The most important calculation, however, came in the middle of the month, at the full-moon phase. The first day of the full moon was identified by the fact that the moon set just minutes after sunrise. Consequently, for a few minutes the moon and sun were both fully visible on opposite horizons (the moon in the west and the sun in the east).

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8Cf. Holladay, “Day(s) the Moon Stood Still,” 170 n. 16, though many earlier interpreters had observed this.
9Though the account of the prayer comes after the report of the hailstorm in the text, the particle that introduces Josh 10:12 (ʿāz) does not suggest that the prayer of Joshua was subsequent to the routing hailstorm; Younger, Ancient Conquest Accounts, 211. Trent Butler comments on the loose connection to the context designated by ʿaz in Joshua 1–12, Word Biblical Commentary, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2014), 462, an opinion also affirmed by David M. Howard, Joshua (Nashville: Broadman and Holman, 1998), 238. Rather than treating the account sequentially, the narrator’s priority is to describe the part played by God’s victory—producing special effects (hailstorm) before explaining Joshua’s unusual request.
10These texts are available in Herman Hunger, Astrological Reports to Assyrian Kings, State Archives of Assyria 8 (Helsinki: University of Helsinki Press, 1992).
This system is the basis for many celestial omens. Ideally, the first day of the full moon fell on the fourteenth of the month. This was considered a good sign because it indicated that the month would be what was generally considered the proper length, and that the new crescent would be seen on the thirtieth day. Months of twenty-nine days were “hollow,” while months of thirty days were “full.” Consequently, one of the omens reads: “(If) on the 14th day the moon and sun are seen together: the speech of the land will become reliable; the land will become happy; the gods will remember Akkad favorably; joy among the troops; the cattle of Akkad will lie in the steppe undisturbed.”

On the other hand, when the opposition of moon and sun took place on one of the other days or weather conditions limited the ability to see when the opposition took place, it was considered a bad omen. For instance: “If on the 15th day the moon and sun are seen together: a strong enemy will raise his weapons against the land: the enemy will tear down the city gate.”

In the ancient Near East, great significance was attached to omens. If an army was going into battle, the omens would be consulted to see what they portended for the day. In the midsection of the month, the celestial omens were undoubtedly considered key indicators of the day on which battle should be joined. One can see, then, that the movement of the sun and moon potentially played a significant role in time of war, especially when a battle was to be enjoined in the middle of the month. That Joshua indicates that the sun is in the east and the moon in the west suggests that it is indeed the middle of the month. It is at the time of the full moon that this positioning occurs.

The terminology encountered in the celestial omens helps to clarify further the situation in Joshua 10. The verb “to wait” (Akkadian quʾʾû) is used in the texts to describe whether the sun and moon are seen together or not. If the moon does not wait for the sun, it means that the moon sets before the sun rises. For example: “If [on the fourteenth day] the moon does not wait for the sun but sets: raging of lions and wolves. It is [subsequently] seen on the fifteenth day with the sun.” Some texts express the same idea with a slightly different wording. Rather than saying that the moon does not wait for the sun, they portray both the sun and the moon as waiting, so that they are not seen together.

The language of these texts demonstrates that the logic of predictable, coordinated movements of these heavenly bodies is not a major factor in the terminology. In addition to the verb “to wait,” another common verb in the omens is the verb “to stand” (Akkadian izzuzu). This verb generally conveys the visibility of one body in the sky, often relative to another body. When the moon stands, however, it is related to its course. For instance, when the moon is said to “stand [in some translations, “hold fast”] in its course” it may mean that it does not move low enough on the horizon for the opposition to occur that would indicate the beginning of the full moon. This constitutes a negative omen on the fourteenth, when it is hoped that the two will “be seen together.” “If [on the fourteenth

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15Places the conjunction between moon and sun indicating that both are subject of the verb. Ibid., 24:6, 23:5, 173:9-10, 92:1-3.

16The opposition occurs when both orbs are fully visible just above their respective horizons. It lasts about four minutes before the moon begins to disappear below the horizon.
day] the moon is fast in its course: business will diminish. On the fifteenth day it will be seen with the sun.”

The words stand and wait (or not) do not refer to taking up specific positions in the sky; they refer to the coordinated movements of the celestial bodies in the given context. The three most frequent observations, then, are:

- The moon (and sun) does not wait, indicating that the moon disappears over the horizon before the sun rises. This phenomenon occurs on the days before opposition takes place.
- The moon and sun are seen together, indicating that they have appeared in opposition on their respective horizons on the first day of the full moon. This could also be expressed by the moon's standing or waiting.
- The moon stands or holds fast, indicating that it is not on the horizon but further up in the sky when the sun rises. This phenomenon would occur on the days after the opposition took place.

Apart from the texts indicating the movements of the heavenly bodies in relation to the first day of the full moon in the middle of the month, there are others that discuss the first appearance of the new moon, which served as the indicator for the first day of the month. The day previous to this appearance is referred to as the day that completes the month.

- If the day reaches its normal length, a reign of long days, the thirtieth day completes the measure of the month.
- When the month has thirty days, as it should, the days are spoken of as being their proper length or full length.

Other astrological omens dealing with the planets and constellations provide meaning for the use of some of the other terminology that occurs in Joshua 10. One text describing the entry of Mars into the precincts of Cancer comments: “In the midst (ina libbi) it did not stand (izzuzu), it did not wait (emēdu), and it did not rest (kāšu); it went forth (uṣṣū) hurriedly.”

The significance of this type of terminology is further confirmed in the canonical omen series known as Enuma Anu Enlil. In this seventy-tablet series, lunar omens make up the first twenty-two tablets. Most extant texts of the series date to the Neo-Assyrian period (Assurbanipal’s library), but earlier texts (sparse as they are) are available from the second half of the seventeenth century (Old Babylonian) and...
are geographically well dispersed.\textsuperscript{22} In fact, during the Late Bronze Age and early Iron Age (overlapping with Middle Babylonian and Middle Assyrian), more celestial omen sources are available from outside Mesopotamia proper than from inside.\textsuperscript{23}

Beyond the omen literature, a final piece of evidence from the incantation literature of Mesopotamia shows how common this type of language was. In a first-millennium–balag–lamentation entitled “He Is a Storm, at the Healing,” the first nine lines describe the anger of the gods. Lines ten through fifteen contain the following:

- The heavens continually rumbled, the earth continually shook;
- The sun lay at the horizon
- The moon stopped still in the midst of the sky
- In the sky the great lights disappeared
- An evil storm . . . , the nations
- A deluge swept over the lands.\textsuperscript{24}

**Terminology of Omens in Joshua 10**

With this understanding of the Mesopotamian omen literature, we may turn attention to the text of Joshua 10:12–14. The key Hebrew verbs for interpreting the section are *dmm*, usually translated “stand still,” and *ʿmd*, usually rendered “stop” (“the sun *dmm* and the moon *ʿmd*”). It has often been observed that the semantic range of *dmm* in Hebrew also includes the meaning “to wait,” as is evidenced in such passages as Lamentations 3:26 and Psalm 37:7.\textsuperscript{25} In both passages it is parallel to the root *yḥl*, with the meaning “to wait,” and in the latter context cannot easily be translated in any other way (“It is good that one should wait [*yḥl*] quietly [*dmm*]”; “Be still [*dmm*] before the LORD and wait patiently [*yḥl*] for him” NIV). Finally, though the root *ʿmd* can mean “to stop,” it is more frequently translated “to stand.”\textsuperscript{26}

The citation from the Book of Jashar in Joshua 10:13 is used to confirm the statement that the sun stood in the midst of the sky. This wording (“midst”) does not demand that the event occurred at midday. Rather, the sky was viewed as having various segments, one major segment being below the horizon, others being above the horizon, and so on. One possibility is that the sun stood in its half of the sky (that is, the eastern half). Standing in the celestial omens refers to taking a position in relation to another body. The wording in Joshua is not significantly different from the statement in the celestial omens that the moon stood in its course.


\textsuperscript{23}Koch, *Mesopotamian Divination Texts*, 159.


\textsuperscript{26}First Samuel 14:9, a noteworthy passage, is the only other place in the Old Testament where the two verbs are used together. There Jonathan discusses with his armor bearer how they will respond to Philistine instruction (NIV “if they say ‘wait [*dmm*] . . . ’ we will stay where we are [*ʿmd*]”).
The movement of the sun is further explained in Joshua 10:13 by the statement that it did not hurry to set. The Hebrew verb used here regularly refers to the setting of the sun, but that does not mean that setting is imminent. From the time that the sun rises it is moving toward setting. Since the sun is in the east, this is simply to be understood as another way of saying that the sun waited or stood.

All of this indicates that the descriptive terminology that appears in the omen texts and also in Joshua 10:12–13 would have been familiar to the Israelite audience and is therefore best interpreted in that light. However, although the connection in terminology is clear enough to give the general direction of interpretation, the specifics of interpretation are still far from certain. If one assumes, then, that an omen was involved and that the request and the description of the event use astrological terminology, there are still a number of alternatives for interpreting the text.

In the omen literature, the conditions of standing, waiting, and not hastening (in its course) are all usually placed in contrast with the sun and moon being seen together; that is, if the celestial bodies wait or stand the opposition that indicates the full moon does not occur. Joshua asks for the sun and moon to stand, which means that he is asking that the opposition not take place. The phrase “full day” indicates that the opposition (and the full moon) occurred on the fourteenth day of the month, so that all of the days of the month are full. The presence of full days indicates a positive omen. However, the determination of whether the omen is positive or negative depends on a number of other factors and cannot be determined with absolute certainty. If the omen is supposed to be positive, the text would be portraying Joshua asking for a sign of divine favor before going into battle, which was common practice for all ancient Near Eastern commanders (see proposition seventeen). If the omen is supposed to be negative, the text would be portraying Joshua asking that his enemies receive a negative sign in their own prebattle divinations, thus damaging their morale. In this case, Joshua is effectively instructing Yahweh on the strategy he wishes the divine warrior to employ in disrupting their enemies. Whether the omen is positive or negative, however, does not change the understanding that the text is using the language of omens rather than physics and astronomy, even if the specifics are obscure. The emphasis of the passage is not on the details of the event but on its noteworthy nature and on the fact that the Lord fought for Israel, one way or another.

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27 No comparable collocations appear in the Hebrew Bible when the motion of the sun is described using this verb in an infinitive construct form preceded by a qualifying finite verb. The combination of sun + enter usually refers to the time of the setting sun or indicates that the sun has set.

28 Even though the texts that have been quoted here are from first millennium Neo-Assyrian documents, on the basis of celestial omens found at Boghaz-Koy, Qatna, Alalakh, Emar, Mari, and Ugarit, Rochberg-Halton concludes that even in the West there was “widespread 2nd millennium interest in celestial omens.” Rochberg-Halton, Aspects of Babylonian Celestial Divination, 30. It is therefore quite likely that the Canaanites made use of celestial omens. For a lunar omen from Ugarit, see Jeffrey L. Cooley, Poetic Astronomy in the Ancient Near East (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2013), 186–87. I am not suggesting that either the Amorites or Joshua were familiar with the series Enuma Anu Enlil—or only that they were aware of at least the basic concepts underlying celestial divination.

29 I will not bother to refute the view that this is a solar eclipse, since there can be no solar eclipse with the sun and moon on opposite horizons. I will likewise give no attention to the well-known hoax report of NASA missing a day, since a casual search on the Internet will suffice to discredit it.

30 For this possibility, see Holladay, “Day(s) the Moon Stood Still,” 166–78.

31 In the rabbinic work Pirque Rabbi Eliezer, a similar perspective is adopted: “Joshua noticed that the heathen were using sorcery to make the heavenly hosts intercede for them in the fight against the Israelites, so Joshua invoked the name of the Lord to make them be still.” Pirque Rabbi Eliezer §52; cited in Louis Ginzberg, ed., Legends of the Jews (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1947), 4:11. Examples of kings receiving omens that portended bad things happening to their neighboring or enemy kings are well attested in the literature. See, for example, no. 384 in Hunger, Astrological Reports, where an eclipse of the sun is interpreted to indicate that the kings of Elam, Subartu, and Westland will die.
"Until": ‘ad Followed by an Imperfect Verb Form

One of the most common objections to the interpretation that the language represents the terminology of omens is that the text as often translated says the heavenly bodies performed their requested actions until the battle was complete.\textsuperscript{32} The phrasing contains extremely complex syntax, and so it needs some technical treatment for those who desire a full analysis.

The preposition ‘ad does, in fact, usually mean “until.” In general, it is worth noting, however, that Bruce Waltke and M. O’Connor list an additional meaning, “before,” for ‘ad in passages in which in the context the action prior to the preposition is antecedent to and in preparation for the action in the clause introduced by ‘ad.\textsuperscript{33} As helpful as that would be for the case that we are proposing, the problem is that all of the other occurrences they point to (Gen 43:25; Ex 22:25; Num 10:21; 2 Kings 16:11) feature ‘ad coupled with the verb bô in the perfect tense, which has the appearance of an idiomatic collocation. In Joshua 10, in contrast, ‘ad is followed by the imperfect form of the verb meaning “avenge” (nqm). It is very unusual (seven occurrences) for the preposition ‘ad to be followed by an imperfect verb form. In fact, one of the major Hebrew lexicons isolates these seven passages as representing a different word entirely from the preposition usually translated “until.”\textsuperscript{34} This syntactical feature calls for treating these passages independently from those that do not use the imperfect form.

The common denominator in these seven passages is that in each one the first clause represents an action A that initiates an enduring or repeated situation B. Then the second clause, featuring ‘ad followed by an imperfect, identifies a subsequent, associated, and anticipated situation C. The initiating action A is punctiliar, and situation B that it initiates then endures until situation C.

Genesis 38:11
Initiating punctiliar action A: Tamar returns to her father’s house
Enduring situation B: She remains there (until)
Anticipated subsequent situation C: Judah’s son would subsequently grow up

Exodus 15:16
Initiating punctiliar action A: God instills fear on enemies
Enduring situation B: Enemies are immobilized by that fear (until)
Anticipated subsequent situation C: Israel would subsequently pass by

1 Samuel 1:22
Initiating punctiliar action A: Hannah decides to stay home when her husband goes to present his vow offering
Enduring situation B: Hannah will stay home each time Elkanah goes to sacrifice (until)
Anticipated subsequent situation C: Samuel would be weaned and taken to the temple


\textsuperscript{33}Bruce Waltke and M. O’Connor, Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990), §11.2.12b, p. 215.

\textsuperscript{34}For treatment see D. J. A. Clines, Dictionary of Classical Hebrew (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic, 1993), 6:270, col. b, entry 3a. Other occurrences are found only in Gen 38:11; Ex 15:16; 1 Sam 1:22; Job 14:6; Ps 110:1; 141:10.
Job 14:6
Initiating punctiliar action A: God would avert his eyes
Enduring situation B: Humans would not be under such intense scrutiny (until)
Anticipated subsequent situation C: People would finish putting in their time on earth

Psalm 110:1
Initiating punctiliar action A: Anointed one will sit down at God's right hand
Enduring situation B: He will remain at God's side and under his protection (until)
Anticipated subsequent situation C: Enemies would be made his footstool

Psalm 141:10
Initiating punctiliar action A: Wicked will fall into nets
Enduring situation B: They will be hindered from acting against the psalmist (until)
Anticipated subsequent situation C: Psalmist would pass by in safety

This now brings us back to Joshua 10:13.

Initiating punctiliar action A: Sun and moon standing still
Enduring situation B: The enduring situation is not the sun and moon standing still; it is the omen, whose enduring effect stands as the victory unfolds over the following days (details in the rest of the chapter)
Anticipated subsequent situation C: Israel would be avenged on its enemies

In this analysis, the movement of the heavenly bodies is only the punctiliar action A that initiates the situation B of the omen, whose impact endures until the anticipated victory that stands as situation C. It is worth noting that situation B is not always explicitly stated by the text (as it is not in Ps 110; 114), and so the fact that it is not explicitly stated in Joshua 10 does not impede this interpretation.

A final point to be made beyond the syntax draws attention to the fact that in the world of omens, it is not only the favorable or unfavorable details of the omen that required interpretation, but the stipulated time period during which it would be in effect. So, for example, in the Substitute King scenarios, the need for putting a substitute on the throne was generally that the diviners had concluded that the life of the king was threatened because of a lunar eclipse. That did not mean that something was expected to happen to the king during the eclipse. The eclipse signaled jeopardy, so a substitute was put on the throne until the effect of the omen was fulfilled. The designated time period for that type of omen was typically one hundred days. If the substitute had not died in that time, he would be put to death to make sure the gods were appeased, then the real king would be restored to the throne. The sign had

effect for one hundred days; the eclipse did not last one hundred days. In Joshua 10, the effect of the omen (opposition of sun and moon) had effect until the nation avenged itself on its enemies; the omen itself did not last that entire time.

**Summary and Conclusions**

It makes much more sense to interpret the text in light of its own cultural context (the world of omens) than in light of our modern understanding of physics. Another point in favor of this view is that it offers a logical reason for Joshua to focus on the sun and moon as the time of the battle approaches.

In light of the language well attested in ancient Near Eastern literature, it is therefore a distortion of the biblical text to suggest that Joshua was requesting that the rotation of heavenly bodies actually cease. He does not know that they are bodies (they are lights); he does not know that they rotate or revolve. Some will complain that this interpretation makes the event far too common and ordinary. After all, the opposition might have failed to occur (whatever that signifies) even if Joshua had not prayed. Where is the supernatural in this? In response I can only point out that even in prayers today one often prays for something to happen and, when it does, considers it a marvelous answer to prayer. The role of God is not diminished just because the event prayed for might have happened without human prayers.

Finally, we need to turn our attention to the narrator’s comment about the day in Joshua 10:14. Though the day is identified as unique in history, the reason given for its uniqueness is not an astronomical phenomenon. Rather, the day is unique because God listens to the voice of a man and fights for Israel. Whatever God specifically does as a result of listening is not really the point; the remarkable nature of the event is not based on the particular phenomena that God brought about (whatever they were). This listening is what the narrator identifies as the singular distinguishing feature of the day. As a result, the reader is not obliged to interpret the behavior of the sun and moon as being unique.